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 "There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management."
 Robert S. McNamara
 In the past, presidents
 have tended to deal with
 a crisis in an ad hoc,
 "I'll cross that bridge
 when I come to it"
 manner. In a nuclear
 age, the US can no
 longer afford such a
 luxury. As recent crises
 suggest, a more self
 conscious, formal
 mechanism for crisis
 management is
 necessary.
 This paper* presents a
 crisis management
 system for the executive
 branch consisting of five
 components: (1) precrisis
 training seminars;
 (2) crisis control centers;
 (3) crisis communication;
 (4) crisis norms and
 procedures; and (5)
 institutionalizing a
 devil's advocate.
 As recent crises?both potentially nuclear and
 nonnuclear?suggest, a more self-conscious, for
 mal mechanism for crisis management is necessary
 at the executive level.
 Foreign policy crises are recurring and exceed
 ingly dangerous. A considerable amount of re
 search has been done in a variety of academic
 disciplines which attempts to understand the na
 ture of crisis, the pressures decision-makers face
 in a crisis, and what might be done to improve
 conflict resolution and crisis management skills.
 This paper attempts to focus that research on the
 American presidency.1 What pressures are a pres
 ident and his top advisers likely to face during a
 crisis? What potential hazards must be avoided?
 How can leaders diffuse tension or better manage
 crises? While crisis management is not a panacea,
 there are a variety of skills which can be brought
 to bear on a crisis which are designed to reduce
 the likelihood that crises will lead to open warfare.
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 Dealing with Crises
 Crisis management has become a frequent style of interaction in world
 politics. The average number of crises has risen in this century compared
 with the last century,2 the frequency of crises confrontation rising more
 than fourfold between 1960 and 1976.3 Between 1946 and 1976, an
 average of 18.2 military conflicts were under way each year.4 Several of
 these conflicts threatened to engage the nuclear powers in a direct con
 frontation. Ip a way, the post-World War II period could be called an
 "age of crisis.55
 Do crises necessarily escalate into war? Since the First World War, 83
 percent of all crises involved the use of force.5 But, although the proportion
 of crises which lead to the use of force among the major powers has
 actually declined in this period,6 the consequences of escalation to violence
 in a crisis involving nuclear armed superpowers have grown even more
 ominous. Particularly during the present period of transition in the in
 ternational system, crisis can be expected to be an endemic feature of
 international life. This being the case, we must become more conscious
 of conflict resolution and crisis management techniques.
 A crisis is an event which occurs suddenly and heightens tensions. It
 appears where stakes are high, where there is little time to decide and act,
 and where decision-makers are under intense pressure. The atmosphere
 is one of uncertainty and contains expectations of hostile action.7
 In a crisis, tradition calls for the president to step to the forefront and
 assume command. As the principal actor in the foreign policy process, the
 president, during a crisis, is granted and assumes wide prerogative powers.8
 Rossiter criticized the separation of powers for its "crisis inefficiencies55
 and suggested that in a crisis we turn to the president as the "constitutional
 dictator.559 Whatever label one cares to place upon the crisis president, it
 is clear that during crises, the public, courts, and Congress generally look
 to the chief executive to assume control. As Klieman writes: "In an emer
 gency, with the nation's fate possibly at stake, power will flow to the
 president. National peril creates the political and psychological conditions
 for the use of power by a determined, confident president. Emergencies
 evoke a psychological need for authority. They also present a need within
 government for centralized leadership and decisive action.5510
 Nuclear versus Nonnuclear Crises
 All crises are threatening, but a crisis with the potential use of nuclear
 weapons introduces threats of such a proportion as to produce unima
 ginable strain upon decision-makers. There is a fundamental difference
 between a nonnuclear crisis, such as the Iranian hostage situation, and a
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 potentially nuclear crisis, such as the Cuban missile crisis. A nonnuclear
 crisis threatens the national interest, whereas a nuclear crisis threatens the
 survival of the system itself.
 With the advent of nuclear weapons, crisis management has been raised
 to a new level.11 In effect, the possession of nuclear weapons has made
 war between the superpowers unacceptable as an option. Thus, states are
 limited in their menu of possible responses when confronting an adversary
 who possesses nuclear weapons. As Richard Ned Lebow writes: "The
 prevailing wisdom is that war as an outcome of crisis between nuclear
 powers has become so disastrous as to be unacceptable. Concern for
 winning confrontations obviously remains and crisis bargaining still entails
 implicit or even explicit threats of war. However, nuclear adversaries must
 be extremely wary of losing control over events or of otherwise becoming
 irrevocably committed to war. Crisis bargaining, so the argument goes,
 has become more difficult because of the unclear boundaries between
 'winning5 and 'disaster avoidance.5 Statesmen must walk a fine line between
 risking war in order to demonstrate resolve and actually pushing the
 confrontation to the point where war becomes likely. The need for caution
 makes it more difficult to impart credibility to any threat to go to war
 because the adversary knows the inherent irrationality of such threats.55
 Lebow adds: "It follows from this paradoxical dynamic that a crisis be
 tween nuclear powers is, in the words of Thomas Schelling, an exercise
 in 'competitive risk-taking.5 Schelling suggests that in practice the thresh
 old of war is likely to be ambiguous. The side that Svins5 is most often
 the side that escalated to the point where a matching escalation is perceived
 by the leaders of the other side to entail greater risks of war than they are
 willing to assume. Put crudely, success hinges upon making an adversary
 believe that he is forced to choose between concession or war.5512
 Crisis Management Defined
 Hilliard Roderick suggests that "Crisis Management consists of con
 tingency planning prior to a crisis and the active management of a crisis
 once it occurs.5513 This definition contains the two primary components
 of crisis management: precrisis planning, and during-crisis steerage. While
 most definitions of crisis management concentrate exclusively on during
 crisis steerage, it is also important to include those steps which can be
 taken prior to the outbreak of a crisis, which can better equip a leader to
 deal with the demands he or she is likely to face during the active man
 agement of a crisis.
 Phil Williams adds another component to our definition of crisis man
 agement when he writes that: "Crisis management is concerned on the
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 one hand with the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so
 that it does not get out of hand and lead to war, and on the other hand
 with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis in which
 the vital interests of the state are secured and protected. The second aspect
 will almost invariably necessitate vigorous actions carrying substantial
 risks. One task of crisis management, therefore, is to temper these risks,
 to keep them as low and as controllable as possible, while the other is to
 ensure that the coercive diplomacy and risk-taking tactics are as effective
 as possible in gaining concessions from the adversary and maintaining
 one's own position relatively intact."14
 Williams's concern for a satisfactory resolution of the crisis (short of
 war or surrender) becomes the third component of crisis management.
 The question then becomes, how does one prepare leaders before a crisis
 to meet the demands of crisis steerage better so as to increase the chances
 that the crisis will be resolved short of war or surrender?
 This paper will concentrate on precrisis planning in an effort to develop
 a better crisis management capacity in the executive branch.
 At present, there is no formal, deliberate at
 tempt to give the president precrisis training.
 While the National Security Council (NSC) has
 a Crisis Management Center, the efforts to bring
 top officials of the administration into a more
 formalized training program are quite limited.
 The lack of explicit precrisis training seems sur
 prising in light of the importance of crisis deci
 sion-making in a nuclear age. After all, given the
 wrong move, leaders may not get a second chance
 to correct their mistakes. And yet, most nations
 seem willing to continue to run the risk of having
 leaders face the pressures of crisis decision-making
 with woefully little preparation.
 Alexander George described the reaction of a senior member of the
 NSC in the Carter administration to its first crisis. He said that "the most
 staggering thing was walking into the White House during our first major
 crisis, wondering what to do, and then all of a sudden realizing that there
 are no rales, no books, and no procedures. One of your first thoughts is
 to ask the President; but the President doesn't know; he only knows what
 the staff tells him."15
 The need for a more self-conscious pre-crisis training vehicle was re
 cently addressed by William Ury when he wrote: "One way to think about
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 United States on the day a new Middle East war broke out or when a
 nuclear missile was launched by accident. What might you wish you had
 talked about beforehand with your Soviet counterpart? What agreements
 to halt escalation would you wish you had reached? What procedures
 would you want to have in place to ensure you were able either to defuse
 the crisis or, better yet, prevent it in the first place? These steps must be
 taken ahead of time because once a crisis erupts it may be too late to create
 new procedures.5516
 A functional precrisis training apparatus must therefore anticipate (by
 reviewing past crises) the problems a leader is likely to face in any crisis
 (generic dysfunctionalism) and better prepare decision-makers to face such
 challenges in the future. A word of caution is in order here. All precrisis
 training can do is attempt to make the process "better55 and increase the
 likelihood that decision-makers will make wiser decisions in a crisis. Such
 training attempts to introduce more rationality into an atmosphere which
 often promotes irrationality. It seeks to give leaders slighdy more control
 in a situation which often seems out of control. It attempts to highlight
 for the leader, those aspects of crisis decision-making most prone to pitfalls,
 and give the leader a more self-conscious approach. And hopefully, by
 having a more deliberate precrisis apparatus for the president, the insti
 tutional memory of the executive branch can help a leader learn from past
 crisis experiences.
 Dysfunctional Aspects of Crisis17
 Among the many pressures a president is likely to face in a crisis are the
 following: shortness of time to decide and act; seriousness of consequences
 (high stakes); incomplete, incorrect or skewed information; psychological
 prejudices (e.g., misperception, fear, hatred, etc.); complexity; an atmos
 phere of uncertainty; poor communication with the adversary; stress or
 fatigue; bureaucratic-organizational resistance; limited options; and cog
 nitive biases.
 As Ury and Smoke point out, "These factors press decision-makers to
 take hasty, often escalatory, action to protect vital interests. Through
 action and reaction, miscalculation and miscommunication, a runaway
 crisis and war may result.5518
 A. Time
 While a crisis may require a speedy response, the danger of a decision
 being made on faulty, incomplete or incorrect information is enormous.
 When the decision-maker feels there is no time to check on information,
 the leader may rush to judgment on the assumption that action is better
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 than inaction. If nothing else, doing something ? anything ? restores
 some sense of control over events. Was that bleep on the computer a sign
 of Soviet attack? If so, how much time do I have to respond? Eleven
 minutes? Six minutes? If I don't decide now, will it be too late?
 Because the dangers of a rash decision are so great for all involved, both
 sides have a stake in controlling the pace of crisis. If there can be a pause,
 a slowing down of events, then both sides will have an opportunity to
 verify information, exchange messages, explore alternatives, and develop
 options short of war. Almost by definition, if one can slow the pace of
 crisis it ceases to be a crisis. This is one of the premier goals of crisis
 management.
 B. High Stakes
 By its very nature, a crisis implies high stakes and serious consequences
 for a wrong move. Since a "perceived vital national interest55 is involved,
 leaders may risk a great deal to protect that which they feel is central to
 their state5s future.
 Since leaders are often willing to go to the brink to protect vital national
 interests, it is important for them to understand clearly which interests
 are vital, and which are secondary. For example, would the Soviet Union
 risk a nuclear war to come to the aid of the Marxist leaders of a small and
 politically insignificant island a few hundred miles from the coast of the
 US? Probably not. However, they probably would be more inclined to
 stand up?militarily if necessary?to a threat to their control of Poland
 which they feel is a vital buffer zone.
 Likewise, the United States can do little in a direct way to aid Afghan
 rebels. Afghanistan is generally seen as not vital to the US national interest,
 and it would be foolish to risk nuclear war over Soviet intervention into
 that country. If, however, Marxist rebels began to make significant inroads
 in Mexico, the United States would be more inclined to intervene
 militarily.
 C. Information
 Sound, rational decision-making requires good information, properly
 presented, clearly understood. As important as good information is, there
 is probably nothing more difficult for a decision-maker than finding un
 ambiguous and reliable information or getting a wide range of options
 from which to choose a course of action. There is nothing diabolical in
 this. Good information is a precious commodity, and even the president,
 who sits atop what, on the surface, appears to be the world's most so
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 phisticated information-gathering apparatus, has difficulty getting infor
 mation in which he can place confidence.
 The information problem is exaggerated in a crisis. When time is short,
 it is even more difficult to check up on the reliability of information. But
 in a crisis, reliable information is vital. While a decision-maker may get
 a sufficient quantity of data or even information overload, quality of
 information is the problem.
 How can the decision-maker insure access to the necessary information?
 There is no foolproof system, but a leader who is aware of the potential
 pitfalls can gain a fighting chance in the search for good information.
 In a crisis, traditional patterns of interaction break down, and the pres
 ident is, in a sense, free of the bureaucratic-institutional restraints under
 which he must usually operate. The president is potentially free to set up
 the information processing system with which he feels most comfortable.
 There is no ironclad "best" system. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis,
 President Kennedy formed what was called the Executive Committee of
 the NSC (ExCom). This was a collection of trusted advisors and military
 personnel who Kennedy believed would give him a broad range of advice,
 and in whose judgments he generally trusted.19
 Kennedy's decision to form ExCom, an ad hoc body of advisers, re
 flected his determination to get a broad range of advice, plus his recog
 nition that the missile crisis required a different apparatus to gather and
 process information. This was not politics as usual, and, given the vast
 array of problems and level of uncertainty, Kennedy decided to go beyond
 the normal advisory process and set up a special unit. This allowed him
 to demand that the advice and information he received was the best
 possible, given the limitations of the situation. He constandy challenged
 the validity of the information given him, he repeatedly questioned the
 assumptions upon which advice was based, and he insisted that a wide
 range of alternatives be explored before a consensus was reached.
 This process did not?could not?guarantee a good decision, but it
 did improve the chances that a rational decision could be reached. This
 process sought to check and recheck information, question and requestion
 assumptions, explore and reexplore alternatives, and walk and rewalk in
 the adversary's shoes.
 While the ExCom style fit Kennedy, not all leaders may feel comfortable
 with such a process. Currendy, the National Security Council has a Crisis
 Management Center which attempts to ready the administration for any
 possible crisis that may emerge. It gathers and analyzes data about potential
 crisis areas, serves as a clearinghouse for crisis management information,
 and is the "institutional memory" of the executive branch from which
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 decision-makers can draw information about past crises in an attempt to
 bring experience to bear on the current crisis. Two additional units assist
 the NSC in crisis management: the Special Situation Group (SSG), chaired
 by the vice president, and the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG), chaired
 by the deputy assistant to the president for National Security Affairs.20
 Whatever apparatus a president employs, there are a variety of potential
 malfunctions in the advisory system which must be avoided. Decision
 makers must be carefiil not to accept information, advice or assumptions
 too readily. Critical thinking in a crisis is essential. This is especially true
 where information is concerned. Presidents need to be suspicious when
 agreement comes too easily; avoid yes men who will too easily agree with
 the leader; be sure that all options are carefully reviewed; avoid isolation;
 be sure that a "devil's advocate"21 is present (and listened to) who will
 challenge, question, and present unpopular ideas; avoid "group think";22
 and prevent the personality of the decision-maker23 from adversely af
 fecting the way information-advice is processed.
 D. Psychological Prejudice and Cognitive Biases
 Perception, or misperception,24 plays an enormous role in decision
 making. Given that both US and Soviet leaders have developed rather
 myopic, devil images of their adversaries,25 it is imperative that prejudices
 or cognitive rigidity do not dictate policy in a crisis. This is not to say
 that both sides enter into the process with a clean slate as regards their
 evaluations of the adversary. Past interactions, historic relations, patterns
 of behavior are all relevant in evaluating the likely response of an adversary,
 but it is too easy to slip into the trap of dehumanizing an adversary.
 Rational decision-making in a crisis requires resisting this temptation.
 Misperception means that there is a discrepancy between image and
 reality. The further removed from reality, the more cognitive processing
 differs from the real world. There are a number of forms of misperception
 which could interfere with sound decision-making: overconfidence of a
 personal (e.g., excessively virile-macho self-image) or military (e.g., belief
 that a military solution is preferable over a diplomatic one) nature; dia
 bolical image of the enemy (e.g., the view that there is a good guy-bad
 guy, devil-angel conflict);26 information problems (e.g., incomplete or
 inaccurate information); institutional forms of misperception (e.g., "group
 think"); denial (the tendency to block out unpleasant circumstances);
 dehumanization (the viewing of others as subhuman or without human
 qualities); projection (attributing our more undesirable traits and char
 acteristics to the adversary); and overpersonalization (as Kennedy said of
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 Khrushchev at the outset of the Cuban missile crisis, "How could he do
 this to me?55).
 Can we create a crisis control system which forestalls all human error
 or folly? A structure that avoids misperception, miscommunication, panic
 or stupidity? Of course, there is no foolproof system, but ways can be
 found ? institutional and individual ? to reduce the dangers of misper
 ception, misinformation, miscommunication, and rash action. To help
 achieve these goals, it is essential to slow down the pace of events, explore
 all options and how they will be viewed by the adversary, open lines of
 communication between adversaries, and give each side a chance to save
 face.
 Additionally, to disengage emotions, a nonthreatening posture is es
 sential. If one side issues a public ultimatum, offering only war or sur
 render, it forces the adversary into a position where it may be impossible
 to back away from the conflict. If one wishes to avoid war, the crisis must
 be viewed as a non-zero-sum game. When one or both sides see the conflict
 in zero-sum terms, where what one side wins, the other loses, the likeli
 hood of war increases significantly. Crisis management must be conscious
 of supplying nonescalatory, nonthreatening options for both sides.
 E. Complexity, Uncertainty, and Communication
 Even under the best circumstances, problem solving is difficult and
 confusing. In a crisis, problems are compounded. Because of the added
 complexity and uncertainty involved in crisis decision-making, it is all the
 more important for leaders to identify clearly the specific nature of the
 perceived threat and its relationship to the national interest.
 Once the nature of the threatened interests is made clear, and it is
 determined to what extent vital national interests are in jeopardy, the
 information process becomes the focal point. In an effort to reduce com
 plexity to manageable proportions, good information is essential.
 Additionally, communication27 with the adversary is necessary. Be it
 through direct leader-to-leader contact (via an improved Hot Line), dip
 lomatic exchange, or informal contacts, both sides must keep talking. Only
 in this way can each side express its views in a clear and, it is hoped,
 nonthreatening manner. Only in this way can measures be devised which
 allow each side to move slowly away from crisis thinking and crisis be
 havior. The irony, however, is that, in a crisis, the temptation is to cut
 off communication, to stop talking.
 F. Stress and Fatigue
 In a crisis, decision-makers are put under an extraordinary amount of
 pressure. The stress and fatigue which result from seemingly endless hours
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 or days of high pressure situations will take a toll on leaders. The question
 is: What impact will this have on leaders?28
 In these high pressure situations the decision-maker may be more vul
 nerable to error. Stress can impair the decision-maker's judgment. The
 cumulative effect of both physical and emotional stress over a prolonged
 period of time can be devastating. As Robert F. Kennedy notes about the
 Cuban missile crisis, ccThat kind of pressure does strange things to a human
 being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men. For some
 it brings out characteristics and strengths that perhaps even they never
 knew they had, and for others the pressure is too overwhelming."29 Ted
 Sorensen, another participant in the Cuban missile crisis, saw "during the
 long days and nights of the Cuban crisis, how brutally physical and mental
 fatigue can numb the good sense as well as the senses of normally articulate
 men."30
 G. Bureaucratic Resistance
 As mentioned previously, in a crisis the traditional institutional and
 bureaucratic controls on a leader begin to fade, and individual or small
 group control emerges. However, this does not mean that the bureaucratic
 apparatus of government can be ignored. To the extent that bureaucratic
 organizations are involved in the process, they are likely to exhibit par
 ochial perspectives, routine behavior, and bureaucratic inertia, and may
 thus retard the crisis decision and action process. And, once decisions are
 made, implementation is turned over to the bureaucracy. Therefore, if one
 is to ensure that the directives of the leadership are fully and accurately
 carried out, attention must be paid to how the permanent government
 receives and processes presidential decisions.
 There is a tendency, once a crisis decision is made, to relax, to act as
 if the real work had been done. But such a temptation must be avoided.
 If decisions are not properly implemented, then all the good ideas and
 calculated moves may be undone by poor execution.
 With these and many other problems multiplying and intensifying dur
 ing a crisis, it is a wonder that a greater percentage of crises do not end
 in war. Crisis presents the leader with a greater need than ever to act
 rationally, and yet a crisis puts multiple pressures on the leader, which
 makes the always elusive goal of rational decision-making even more
 difficult.
 Given that, even in the most calm and secure of circumstances, achieving
 complete rationality is difficult, is there a way during a crisis to promote
 the limited goal of greater rationality?
 Crises are not entirely idiosyncratic. There are general patterns which
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 become the basis for prescriptive analysis. If the techniques of better crisis
 management are to be conveyed to top decision-makers, ways must be
 found to tailor the generalized knowledge of crisis decision-making to
 meet the particular needs of each crisis. Moreover, ways must be found
 to inform leaders as to what problems they are most likely to face during
 a crisis, and how they might better overcome these potential pitfalls.
 Richard Ned Lebow faces this when he writes: "The only way to combat
 the incredible pressures likely to confront national leaders facing the pos
 sibility of nuclear holocaust is to provide them with the preparation and
 training to overcome their human frailties. ... In a nuclear crisis, a leader's
 ability to cope successfully is likely to be increased by his willingness to
 adapt his policies to changing circumstances. Also, a leader's decisions can
 be improved immeasurably by solid grounding in the technical issues likely
 to be confronted. Presidents who have not previously studied crisis man
 agement or who have not gone through crisis drills are likely to be in
 sufficiendy aware of the danger of loss of control associated with high
 alert levels. They are also likely to become captive to prepackaged options
 that bear little resemblance to their political needs at the time."31
 Developing a Crisis Management System
 Can decision-makers be trained to deal with crises more effectively? At
 present, there is little or no preparation to help leaders deal with crisis
 management. But there are steps which can be taken and which can in
 crease the likelihood that, during a crisis, leaders will deal with the problem
 in a more rational manner. On the surface, such a qualified endorsement
 may appear to be a rather small step, but in a crisis, disasters are often
 made of small mistakes.
 A more self-conscious, institutionalized precrisis approach needs to be
 developed which will better prepare an incoming president and top mil
 itary and civilian officials to face the varied demands of crisis management.
 Such a crisis management program should include (at a minimum) the
 following:
 A. Crisis Training Seminars
 One of the most important steps which could be taken to improve the
 crisis management capability of the executive branch would be to institute
 a series of crisis training seminars for the president and other top admin
 istrative officials.32 Such seminars could be held before a new president
 takes office (during the preinaugural period) and also, periodically, during
 his tenure.
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 The precrisis briefing should have a fairly specific set of objectives. As
 Ury and Smoke suggest, it should include the following:
 (1) Understanding the range of possible nuclear crises scenarios, with
 some emphasis on crisis scenarios other than the "bolt from the blue55 and
 Central European scenarios.
 (2) A review of past crises and their lessons (for instance, the Cuban
 missile crisis).
 (3) Understanding the current American crisis management system and
 crisis decision-making process, including its weaknesses and fragilities.
 (4) Understanding the Soviet crisis management system and style, in
 cluding its weaknesses and fragilities.
 (5) Understanding joint Soviet-American institutional arrangements,
 such as the Hot Line, Accidents Agreement, etc.
 (6) Appreciating the range of possible strategies for negotiating with
 the USSR in times of crisis.
 (7) A previous opportunity to practice a decision sequence, to experi
 ment, and to make mistakes.
 (8) Experiencing, at least in part, the sensations, stress, time constric
 tion, and emotions of a nuclear crisis (so that leaders will not be wholly
 unfamiliar with them in the actual event.)33
 Ury and Smoke also suggest: "The briefing would not emphasize po
 litical and military decisions more than details of military capabilities or
 hardware (on which the president-elect would be officially briefed after
 inauguration). It would focus more on how a president should think about
 problems in managing crises and reaching decisions than on the technical
 details of airborne command posts or 'pre-programmed nuclear options.5
 Finally, it would attempt to communicate the accumulated body of prec
 edents, amounting in a sense to unwritten 'understandings5 about how the
 two superpowers will behave in crisis. It is not clear that this accumulated
 learning is fully passed on through changes of administration in
 Washington.5534
 In addition to giving the new administration the benefit of insights by
 past participants, the seminar's briefings should also include films dealing
 with past crises (e.g., Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis); simulation
 exercises (in an effort to give the leaders some sense of the actual situational
 demands of a crisis); case study reviews (to show how crises started, how
 they were dealt with, etc.); crisis planning (charting out, in advance, the
 kinds of crises that might arise, and anticipating how such crises might
 be dealt with organizationally; and other shoes exercises (having top of
 ficials assume the roles of the Soviets in an effort to sensitize them to the
 demands and behavior patterns of a potential adversary).
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 B. Crises Control Centers
 Presently under review in both Moscow and Washington is the pro
 posal, championed by the late Senator Henry Jackson and recendy pro
 moted by Senators Nunn and Warner, to establish crisis control and risk
 reduction centers.
 Such centers,35 to be located either in one neutral site, or two centers,
 one in the US and one in the Soviet Union, would be staffed by military
 and diplomatic personnel. Their primary mission would be to monitor
 possible crisis situations. But they could do much more.
 The centers could be active with both precrisis management and during
 crisis activities. Prior to a crisis, these centers could exchange information,
 clarify activities (e.g., troop movements), exchange technical information
 and problem solving, conduct high level discussions, maintain expertise,
 train officials in crisis management, and head off potential crisis situations.
 During a crisis, these centers could help carry out emergency safety pro
 cedures, verify information, exchange messages, keep lines of communi
 cation open, etc.
 If such centers were taken seriously by both sides, and became the hub
 of an ongoing exchange process, they could prove invaluable in allowing
 each nation to stem the tide of crises, especially those involving accidents
 and third party confrontations. The potential for such centers to broaden
 their activities (e.g., to deal with terrorism) must also be considered.
 C. Crisis Communication
 During a crisis, the need for direct communication is strongest. Yet, it
 is in just such times that the tendency not to communicate is most pro
 nounced. This being the case, conscious efforts must be made to deal with
 communication shutdowns before a crisis makes such steps unlikely.
 In addition to the establishment of crisis control centers, several steps
 can be taken to improve communication between the superpowers. An
 improved Hot Line that takes advantage of state of the art technology
 could connect the White House to the Kremlin, and crisis control center
 to crisis control center. The Hot Line (or Direct Communications Link,
 DCL) would add to its satellite communications circuits a facsimile trans
 mission capability, as well as a voice and video capability.
 An additional way to supplement communication between the super
 powers would be to regularize summit meetings. This should not be
 restricted to just the heads of state, but should also include establishing
 regular summits with Cabinet and ministerial level officials of the US and
 the Soviet Union.
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 D. Establishing Crisis Procedures
 Is it possible to establish norms or procedures to be followed in the
 event of a crisis? Can rules of the game be developed? Such a notion has
 generated a great deal of interest in the last several years.36 Explicit, agreed
 upon ground rules for crisis behavior which clarified expected actions,
 defined boundaries beyond which adversaries should not tread, and a set
 of understood signals, might have the effect of making wars less likely.
 Such rules are needed because the present system of communicating during
 crisis is often ambiguous, and because the existing mechanism or rules are
 too weak.
 Coral Bell suggests the following as a basic set of precrisis guidelines
 to be followed in a crisis:
 (1) Communications with the adversary must and will be maintained
 and should grow closer and more intensive as the confrontation sharpens.
 (2) One should not seek to win too much, since the other side cannot
 afford to lose too much.
 (3) One must build "golden bridges55 behind the adversary to facilitate
 his retreat. No situation could be more dangerous in the nuclear age than
 to box one of the nuclear powers into a corner.
 (4) Contingency plans must not be allowed to dictate the manner in
 which the crisis is managed.
 (5) Local crises shall be met in local terms, even a crisis of the central
 balance shall be met at least initially in conventional terms.
 (6) The other's side of influence requires a special wariness and restraint
 when touched by intramural crises in the way of dissent.
 (7) The powers will not allow their signals to each other to become
 infected with an excess of misleading ambiguities through consultation
 with allies.
 (8) Surveillance by contemporary means is legitimate and will not be
 interfered with.37
 Estabhshing crisis rules is not a new concept. In 1972 the US and Soviet
 Union reached an "Incidents at Sea55 agreement, which created a set of
 guidelines to be followed in order to avoid a crisis at sea. Such an agree
 ment could be the base on which other ground rules could be established
 (dealing with air space, for example, which might have prevented an
 incident such as the Soviet shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007).
 Ground rule agreements might include procedures for dealing with
 nuclear detonations of unknown origin; ways to signal peaceful intent
 (what Ury and Smoke call "Hands Off Holsters55 signals38); prearranged
 agreements establishing face-to-face meetings in times of crises; and con
 tingency plans to establish a cease-fire during a crisis. As Ury and Smoke
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 note: "The essential value of these agreed-upon crisis procedures lies in
 making sure that when the leaders of each side want to avoid or defuse
 a crisis, they will not fail for simple lack of machinery to do so."39
 E. Institutionalizing a Devil's Advocate Function
 While a discussion of all the organizational problems arising in crisis
 management is beyond the scope of this paper, a few proposals for im
 proving the presidential capacity to deal with organizational difficulties
 in a crisis can be advanced.
 Information, options, and advice are the most valuable decision-making
 components in a crisis. But, as we have already noted, in a crisis, there
 are a variety of roadblocks which make it less likely that good information,
 options, and advice will reach the president in a usable form. How might
 these impediments be circumvented?
 In part, the problem of information stems from presidential personality.
 If a president does not demand good information?which means occa
 sionally accepting critical advice or adverse information?he will not be
 likely to get it. But beyond the personality dimension, organizational
 problems inhibit the decision-making process. There is a tendency for the
 group to agree too readily, defer to the believed wishes of the president,
 not cover a sufficient range of alternatives, exclude unpopular viewpoints,
 rely on a narrow information source, leave assumptions unchallenged,
 cling to group identity, and fail to examine risks fully. In short, the prob
 lems?often referred to as "group think"40?cloud the information-de
 cision-making process.
 As a possible solution to these problems, Alexander George suggests
 that presidents implement a system of "multiple advocacy."41 Such a system
 would seek to institutionalize a "devil's advocate" function in the presi
 dential advisory system. This could be realized in the form of a lone
 individual or small department whose sole job would be to tear apart the
 assumptions and views of the consensus, to assume the contrary posi
 tion^), and to reexamine the goals, assumptions, and approaches of the
 group. The individual or head of such a group must be someone close to,
 and trusted by, the president, lest his functions degenerate into an "Oh,
 not this again!" type of role. For a devil's advocate to work, the devil's
 advocate must be respected and listened to.
 In an effort to counteract the tendency toward "group think," Irving
 Janis offers several prescriptions:
 (1) The leader of a policy-forming group should assign the role of
 critical evaluator to each member, encouraging the group to give high
 priority to airing objections and doubts.
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 (2) The leaders in an organization's hierarchy should be impartial instead
 of stating preferences and expectations at the outset.
 (3) The organization should routinely follow the administrative practice
 of setting up several independent policy-planning and evaluation groups
 to work on the same policy question, each carrying out its deliberations
 under a different leader.
 (4) The policy making group should from time to time divide into two
 or more subgroups to meet separately, under different chairmen, and then
 come together to hammer out their differences.
 (5) Each member of the policy making group should discuss periodically
 the group's deliberations with trusted associates in his own unit of the
 organization and report back their reactions.
 (6) One or more outside experts or qualified colleagues within the
 organization should be encouraged to challenge the views of the core
 members.
 (7) At every meeting devoted to evaluating policy alternatives, at least
 one member should be assigned to the role of devil's advocate.
 (8) A sizable bloc of time should be spent surveying all warning signals
 from the rivals and constructing alternate scenarios from the rivals'
 intentions.
 (9) After reaching a preliminary consensus, the policy making group
 should hold a "second chance" meeting at which every member is expected
 to express as vividly as he can all his residual doubts and rethink the entire
 issue before making a definitive choice.42
 Institutionalizing the multiple advocacy role cannot guarantee that a
 thorough review of options, information, assumptions, and risks will take
 place. It does, however, increase the likelihood that this may take place.
 Regardless of the method one uses to try to offset the pathologies of
 the decision-making process, there must be a willingness, especially on the
 part of the president, to face up to the criticisms of the devil's advocate.
 These steps, to be effective, cannot be reduced to empty ritual.
 Conclusion
 No system of crisis management can replace good judgment; no system
 can substitute for wisdom; and no system?however good?can over
 come human frailties. However, a solid crisis management system can
 improve the likelihood that good decisions are reached and that the grosser
 manifestations of irrationality become less pronounced.
 While it is common to deal with decision-making from a "rational actor"
 perspective, it is clear that in a crisis, rationality is a far cry from reality.
 In a crisis, when leaders need to be their most rational, the dynamics of
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 the situation impose the most irrational of demands, and a variety of
 individual, psychological, and organizational roadblocks impede any hope
 of achieving full rationality. Crisis management does not promise to pro
 vide a rational atmosphere or a rational decision. Its goal ? limited but
 very important ? is simply to promote greater rationality at a time when
 it is most needed.
 In general, we are aware of the problems which will most likely arise
 in a crisis. On the basis of reviews of past crises, we know what to watch
 out for. While each crisis has its own dynamic, there are lessons which
 emerge when examining crises in a generic sense. Knowing what problems
 are most likely to interfere with sound decision-making means that we
 may be able to correct for such problems and that we need not be victim
 ized by them. In short, we can do better ? if we think, if we are willing
 to learn.
 If decision-makers are aware of the traps that they are most likely to fall
 into ? and are aware of possible ways out ? perhaps they can do better.
 The example of President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis, who, having
 just read Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August, was determined not to
 repeat the same mistakes which led to the outbreak of World War I, should
 serve as an example of our ability to learn from the past. Kennedy acted
 as if he knew what to do, what to avoid. Reading The Guns of August
 alerted him to a variety of problems which he took great pains to overcome.
 The crisis management system herein proposed consists of five com
 ponents: 1) precrisis training seminars; 2) crisis control centers; 3) crisis
 communication; 4) crisis norms or procedures; and 5) institutionalizing
 a devil's advocate function. Together, they make up a system which is
 designed to provide the opportunity for more rationality in crisis decision
 making. Such a system is designed to try and offset many of the problems
 which a decision-maker is likely to face in a crisis (see Figure 1).
 No crisis management system should be viewed as a panacea. But be
 cause of the danger of a crisis escalating into war, it is imperative that we
 develop better ways to deal with such situations. Much can be done to
 make crises more manageable. If presidents will continue to face crises
 which threaten to lead to war, it is important that we give the president
 better tools with which to manage such problems.
 NOTES_
 * Adapted from a paper prepared for delivery at the 1986 annual meet
 ing of the Western Political Science Association, Eugene, Oregon, March
 20-22, 1986.
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 FIGURE 1
 Selected Dysfunctional Aspects of Crisis and Crisis Management System Remedies
 Problem





 Lack of communication with adversary
 Stress
 Bureaucratic: group think
 Yes men
 Selective compliance
 Analysis of risks
 Possible Remedy
 Slow pace of crisis
 Explore wide range of information
 options; see from "other shoes"
 perspective_
 Wide range of information sources
 Wide range of advice "Other shoes" approach
 Keep channels open and varied Slow pace of crisis; disengage
 emotions
 Challenge assumptions
 Wide range of options-alternatives DeviPs advocate; training seminars
 Vigilance; monitoring Wide range of advice
 Crisis Management System Category
 Crisis norms and procedures
 Crisis communication; devil's advocate;
 training seminars
 Devil's advocate Devil's advocate
 Communication; training seminar;
 devil's advocate
 Crisis control centers: communication
 All categories
 Devil's advocate; training seminars
 Training seminars
 Training seminars; devil's advocate;
 communication
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 Within the field of political sci
 ence, especially in the United
 States, there has been much writ
 ten on decision-making. In fact,
 some theorists have seen it as the
 primary area of concern. An influ
 ential monograph was drafted at
 Princeton University in 1962 ti
 ded Foreign Policy Decision-Mak
 ing: An Approach to the Study of
 International Politics. In it the au
 thors stated: "State action is the
 action taken by those acting in the
 name of the state. Hence, the state
 is its decision-makers. ... It is one
 of our basic choices to take as our
 prime analytical objective the re
 creation of the 'world5 of the deci
 sion-makers as they view it.551
 Within the field of decision
 making theory, crisis decisions be
 come a major object of study. Ma
 jor decisions to sign treaties, de
 clare war, intervene in police
 conflict, fire generals, withdraw
 aid, and so forth became the sub
 ject matter of books and articles in
 the 19605s. Since then, much has
 been written and learned about
 perception, choice, expectations,
 the limits of rationality, and the
 decision-making environment. De
 spite much available knowledge
 about how to handle or manage
 crises, each new administration
 seems to come to the White
 House to learn by trial and error.
 Michael A. Genovese is right to
 question why there has been no
 formal method of handling crises
 available to the president, espe
 cially when, as Robert McNamara
 said, "There is no longer any such
 thing as strategy, only crisis man
 agement.55 Genovese5s viewpoint
 has also been tempered by the les
 sons learned from the mistakes of
 reductionism in the 19605s, thus
 stating that, "While crisis manage
 ment is not a panacea, there are a
 variety of skills that can be
brought to bear on a crisis.55
 Genovese points to two compo
 nents of crisis management: pre
 crisis planning and during-crisis
 st erage. Most available research is
 aimed at the during-crisis steerage
 component. Genovese focuses his
 attention on the less discussed
 precrisis planning. He argues that
 such planning can improve deci
 sion-making when serious situa
 tions arise. Good information, ra
 tional decisions, walking in the
 adversary's shoes, and knowledge
 of the right priorities are all im
 portant. Precrisis planning can
 help ensure that all these factors
 are present when a crisis arises.
 The crisis management system
 that Genovese proposes consists of
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 five components: precrisis train
 ing, crisis control centers, crisis
 communication, crisis norms, and
 a deviFs advocate function. These
 are not spurious suggestions but
 reflect serious reading and
 thought about the above men
 tioned literature. I really have litde
 argument with this proposal. We
 would all feel more secure if we
 knew that our president was
 equipped to make the best deci
 sion possible in times of crisis.
 All leaders in peaceful societies,
 from primitive tribes to complex
 societies, are required to undergo
 a ritual process to gain the confi
 dence of those who are to be led
 or protected. In this dimension,
 the United States has not achieved
 a high level of maturity. I would
 like to see some form of precrisis
 training as part of the ritual proc
 ess through which one goes to be
 come a national leader. In the era
 of nuclear weapons, wise leader
 ship is more important than in
 any other period of history. We
 cannot rely on the fact that a
 leader was successful in local po
 litics, is a good religious person,
 has oratorical skills, or was chosen
 because of loyalty to his party.
 These factors, while all good as
 sets, are not adequate for national
 leadership in an unpredictable in
 ternational climate.
 Beyond a crisis management
 system, two factors are important
 to keep in mind. First, we should
 remember that, even with the
 greatest amount of information
 available to the human mind, deci
 sions are still largely based (per
 haps 90 percent) on nonrational
 factors. Second, we should strive
 to find ways to prevent crises
 from arising at all.
 With respect to the first point,
 habit and conditioning are the
 most important factors in shaping
 human response to events. A crisis
 training seminar might be able to
 run new officeholders through a
 few simulated experiences which
 can aid in habit formation. How
 ever, the will, values, and charac
 ter of the individual leader are
 largely determined by the family,
 education, and the culture from
 which he comes. I believe Aristo
 de was essentially correct in argu
 ing that knowledge is hollow un
 less it is applied by virtuous
 people.
 This leads to my second point.
 If, as Genovese has stated, the fre
 quency of crises rose fourfold be
 tween 1960 and 1976, then we
 have an even more serious prob
 lem than that which crisis man
 agement can help to solve. Why is
 it that so many crises arise? One
 factor, I believe, is the nature of
 modern bureaucratic states. In the
 Soviet Union, one of the most
 centrally managed societies to ex
 ist, it is virtually impossible for
 major change to take place with
 out a problem developing into a
 crisis of major proportions. In the
 United States we have developed
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 the terms "incrementalism" and
 "the art of muddling through" to
 describe how crisis forces deci
 sion-making. Rather than leaders
 creating healthy, relatively crisis
 free environments, we witness en
 vironments on the brink of chaos
 pushing government officials to
 act. This is almost the reverse of
 leadership. It is precisely the func
 tion of a bureaucrat to "manage."
 Hence, crisis "management" be
 comes the approach of one work
 ing within a system where one re
 sponds to problems when they
 affect the life of the system. One
 can hardly say that those people in
 positions of power and prestige
 that respond in this fashion really
 have national destinies under their
 control. "Precrisis planning" could
 even be preceded by a "crisis
 avoidance philosophy.55 This is
 easier to develop on the domestic
 than the international level.
 In conclusion, major social and
 political transformation in the
 present era is even more urgently
 required than a crisis management
 system. However, regardless of
 what type of state we have, the
 crisis management system which
 Genovese proposes can only be of
 positive value. It may not be able
 to save cultures in decline or those
 with fundamental systemic flaws;
 however, it can avert a disaster
 which could arise from mispercep
 tions, misinformation, "group
 think,55 and other symptoms of
 unqualified decision-makers.
 NOTE
 1 Richard C. Snyder et al, "The Decision-Making Approach to the
 Study of International Politics," quoted in James N. Rosenau, editor,
 International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: Macmillan Free
 Press, 1969, p. 202.
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